We tested the hypothesis that evaluative bias in common ingroup contexts versus crossed categorization contexts can be associated with two distinct underlying processes. We reasoned that in common ingroup contexts, self-categorization, but not perceived complexity, would be positively related to intergroup bias. In contrast, in crossed categorization contexts, perceived complexity, but not self-categorization, would be negatively related to intergroup bias. In two studies, and in line with predictions, we found that while self-categorization and intergroup bias were related in common ingroup contexts, this was not the case in crossed categorization contexts. Moreover, we found that perceived category complexity, and not self-categorization, predicted bias in crossed categorization contexts. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of social categorization and intergroup bias.
Understanding the dynamics of social categorization, and its relation to social differentiation and discrimination, has helped psychologists develop multiple models for reducing prejudice. The common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000 ) is one such model, focusing on how perceiving a shared categorization can attenuate intergroup bias. A second approach to reducing bias is crossed categorization (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007) , which focuses on the creation and perception of cross-cutting or overlapping categorizations. In this article, we argue that while creating both common ingroup and crossed categorization contexts reduce intergroup bias, they can do so via different psychological processes. Furthermore, we argue that these different routes to reduced bias can be dissociated such that self-categorization, but not complexity, will predict bias in common ingroup contexts, while perceived complexity, but not self-categorization, will predict bias in crossed categorization contexts.
Common Ingroup Identity Model
The common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989) proposes that to reduce intergroup bias, existing boundaries between groups should be eliminated so that both groups are included in one superordinate group, transforming group members' cognitive representations from two groups (us and them) to one inclusive group (we). According to the metac-ontrast principle (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) , two groups will only be perceived as such to the extent that the differences between the two groups outweigh the differences within each group. Thus, when similarity weakens the intergroup boundary, the two groups will be recategorized, with members perceiving themselves as a single superordinate group. When this occurs, former ingroup and outgroup members share a new ingroup membership, causing the intergroup bias associated with the original subgroups to be reduced or eliminated.
Crossed Categorization
The crossed categorization approach involves making two categorical dimensions simultaneously salient for participants faced with group-relevant social judgments and, as with the common ingroup identity approach, has also been shown to reduce intergroup bias (e.g., Crisp & Hewstone, 1999 , 2000 Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Miller, Urban, & Vanman, 1998; Vanbeselaere, 1987) . Take, for example, an intergroup dichotomy based on gender. Although men and women typically show ingroup favoritism, in a crossed categorization context, instead of attending only to gender, they simultaneously attend to a second dimension, for example, age. This creates four groups-young men, old men, young women, and old women-changing the way people perceive ingroup and outgroup members. For young male perceivers, for example, other young men are double ingroup members (sharing two categories in common), old men and young women are partial ingroup members (sharing one category in common), and old women are double outgroup members (sharing neither category in common). In this context, men and women can be seen to share a common category; both women and men can be young, or both women and men can be old.
Both common ingroup identity and crossed categorization approaches reduce evaluative bias by emphasizing a category that is shared by both the ingroup and the outgroup. However, an important difference between the two approaches is that the common ingroup approach involves simplifying the intergroup situation by bringing two separate groups together within the context of one shared identity group. In contrast, the crossed categorization approach involves making the intergroup context more complex, by creating four subgroups instead of two initial groups. These structural distinctions mean that the common ingroup and crossed categorization approaches reduce prejudice in different, and empirically separable, ways. Crisp and Hewstone (2007) proposed a model of multiple categorization effects whereby social categorization can affect intergroup bias via two different processes, depending on the structural relations between categories in a given intergroup context. Crisp and Hewstone drew upon Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model in making the distinction between modes of thought in different categorization settings, defined by category complexity. According to Fiske and Neuberg, at low levels of stimulus complexity, categorizing individuals into groups is an adaptive, functional mechanism, which adds meaning and clarity, predictability and coherence to the social world (Fiske & Taylor, 1991 ; see also Hamilton, 1979; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2001 ). In contrast, at high levels of stimulus complexity, categorization-based heuristics are no longer functional, and so perceivers switch to more effortful, piecemeal processing strategies to form impressions of others. Crisp and Hewstone (2007) argued, consistent with this model, that when category complexity is relatively low, categorization (and, in turn, category differentiation) is the underlying basis for determining intergroup bias (see Doise, 1978; Turner et al., 1987) . Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) maintained that the common ingroup identity approach works via this mechanism because it involves former outgroup members becoming ingroup members through a process of recategorization into a common ingroup identity; in other words, it involves the elimination of the initial basis for differentiation.
Two Routes to Reduced Bias
In contrast to this relatively simple categorization context, Crisp and Hewstone (2007) argued that when complexity is relatively highfor example, as a result of exposure to the full crossed categorization design (i.e., four subgroups formed by crossing two dimensions of categorization, resulting in a mixed pattern of ingroup and outgroup affiliations)-a different process can occur (see Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Hall & Crisp, 2005; Hutter & Crisp, 2005) . In line with the Fiske and Neuberg (1990) model, while perceivers can certainly process categorical information and make judgments along two criteria (Vanbeselaere, 1987) , the need to take account of multiple dimensions can also instigate cognitive processes associated with greater complexity. Fiske and Neuberg's continuum model of impression formation specifies one extremity as category-based processing and the other as attribute-based (individuated) processing. Applying this model to intergroup contexts, as the nature of the intergroup context becomes more complex, categories are no longer useful in making judgments about others, and the perceiver must shift from relying on simple categories toward more complex construals in order to form an impression of the target (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007 ; see also Brewer, 1988) .
If we are correct in our assertion that common ingroup contexts "fit" the categorization end of Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum, while crossed categorization contexts do not, then we can make a very simple prediction: Established categorization process phenomena should be observed within common ingroup contexts but not within full crossed categorization contexts. In two studies we tested these ideas.
Study 1
In Study 1 we tested the idea that a range of effects associated with the heuristic use of social categorization in guiding impression formation would be observed in common ingroup contexts but not in a fully specified crossed categorization context. Note that we are careful to say "fully specified" crossed categorization context-many studies focus on comparisons of only a subset of the subgroups formed from crossing categories, and such comparisons are, in essence, common ingroup contexts. In our methodology section we spell out in detail the designs used, and the need to ensure that they fully capture the complexity element that we argue is key to differentiating the proposed processing modes.
As a basis for our comparison, we focused on a set of categorization-based processes well established as critical in common ingroup contexts. We now know that a common ingroup identity can sometimes reduce intergroup bias (e.g., Gaertner et al., 1989 Gaertner et al., , 1990 , but sometimes increase bias (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000) , and that the critical determinant is subgroup identification (Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006a; Crisp, Walsh, & Hewstone, 2006b ). According to the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ; see also Abrams & Hogg, 1998) , distinctive social categorization also helps us to clarify and define social situations, providing a set of prescriptive ingroup norms to guide behavior and to interpret outgroup behavior (Brewer, 1993; Hogg, 2000) . Creating a common ingroup context should therefore arouse motivations to reestablish distinctiveness, achieved through self-categorization as an ingroup (vs. outgroup) member, and evaluative differentiation (bias). However, this should only be the case for people who value their ingroup in the first placehigh identifiers (see Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004) . In common ingroup contexts, identification should therefore be positively related to self-categorization and bias, and notably, when subgroup distinctivenesss is maintained within a common ingroup, the reactive increase in bias should be avoided (the so-called dual-identity approach; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) , especially for higher identifiers (see Crisp, Stone, & Hall, 2006 , Experiment 4). There is considerable evidence that subgroup identification is exactly what determines whether a common ingroup identity will decrease or increase intergroup bias (see Crisp & Beck, 2005; Crisp et al., 2006a; Crisp et al., 2006b; van Leeuwen, van Knippenberg, & Ellemers, 2003 ; for a review, see Crisp, 2006) .
We argue that these established relationships should be observed in a common ingroup condition but not, if we are correct in our application of the continuum model to our different category contexts, under crossed categorization conditions. Specifically, we also predicted that the relationship between identification and intergroup bias should be mediated by participants' self-categorization as a member of the ingroup (vs. the outgroup). If the link between identification and bias is broken in the crossed categorization condition (but not in the common ingroup condition), due to the proposed shift from simple, category-based process to a more complex mode of impression formation, participants will no longer self-categorize as an in-group member and no longer respond to perceived threats to distinctiveness. This should be evident on a measure of self-ingroup representational overlap, which will mediate the effects of identification on bias.
Method
Participants and design. Fifty-three female nurses (ages between 21 and 62 years, with a mean age of 32 years) working at a large hospital in a British city were randomly assigned to the three levels of a one-factor between-subjects design (condition: baseline vs. common ingroup vs. crossed categorization), with identification as a continuous predictor and intergroup bias and self-categorization as the dependent measures. In all conditions, participants were asked to compare nurses and doctors, and in the common ingroup and crossed categorization conditions this was within the context of their own hospital (Hospital A) versus the second hospital in the city (Hospital B). Hospital A caters to residents in the south of the city and has 4500 staff members, and Hospital B caters to residents in the north of the city, with 5500 staff members. Both hospitals share relatively high status, being the two largest hospitals in the city.
Procedure. Participants were first informed that the researcher was conducting a study on the perceptions of different occupations within the U.K.'s National Health Service (NHS). They were then told that in this particular survey they would be asked to think about nurses and doctors. Participants' level of ingroup identification with their occupational group was then assessed by asking them to rate the extent to which they agreed with the following four statements (adapted from Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) : "I identify strongly with other nurses"; "Being a nurse is an important part of who I am"; "I feel strong ties with other nurses"; and "I feel a sense of solidarity with other nurses" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). These items formed a reliable index (␣ ϭ .88). Participants' level of ingroup identification with their hospital was assessed using the same four statements as above, but they were asked about Hospital A rather than about other nurses (␣ ϭ .95).
Participants were then told, "This survey is concerned with the attitudes of medical staff within the NHS, and how their respective qualities can contribute to generic (i.e., nonmedical) problem-solving work teams. The information provided from this survey will be useful when assessing the general team-working across a variety of medical staff." The target groups that participants were asked about in the remainder of the questionnaire differed depending on the condition to which they were allocated (see Table 1 ).
In the baseline condition, participants were told that they were going to be asked to think specifically about nurses and doctors and that they would be asked to compare the groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, participants were asked to circle their profession (nurse or doctor). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonmedical problemsolving task for nurses and doctors: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) nurses, (b) doctors"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) nurses, (b) doctors would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) nurses, (b) doctors" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). Finally, participants were presented with the Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) , seven pairs of circles that vary from no overlap to almost total overlap. Participants were asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) nurses and (b) doctors.
In the common ingroup condition, participants were told that they were going to be asked to think specifically about nurses and doctors from Hospital A and medical staff (i.e., in general) at Hospital B and that they would be asked to compare these groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, participants were asked to circle their job role (nurse or doctor) and their hospital (A or B). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonmedical problem solving task for nurses at Hospital A, doctors at Hospital A, and staff at Hospital B: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) Hospital B staff"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) Hospital B staff would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) Hospital B staff" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). Finally, participants were presented with the IOS scale, for which they were asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) nurses from Hospital A (b) doctors from Hospital A, and (c) Hospital B staff.
In the crossed categorization condition, participants were told that they were going to be asked to think specifically about nurses and doctors at Hospital A and nurses and doctors at Hospital B and that they would be asked to compare these groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, participants were asked to circle their job role (nurse or doctor) and their hospital (A or B). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonmedical problem-solving task for nurses at Hospital A, doctors at Hospital A, nurses at Hospital B, and doctors at Hospital B: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) nurses from Hospital B, (d) doctors from Hospital B"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) nurses from Hospital B, (d) doctors from Hospital B would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) nurses from Hospital B, (d) doctors from Hospital B" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). Finally, participants were presented with the IOS scale, for which they were asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) nurses from Hospital A, (b) doctors from Hospital A, (c) nurses from Hospital B, and (d) doctors from Hospital B. By getting participants to make comparisons along two cross-cutting dimensions (occupation and workplace) simultaneously, this condition represented a fully specified crossed categorization design.
In order to determine that the questions asked in the crossed categorization condition were perceived as more complex than those in either the common ingroup condition or the baseline condition, we conducted a pilot study in which we asked 14 participants to rate the complexity of the questions relating to the different target groups (nurses, doctors, Hospitals A and B) on a 7-point Likert scale. A one-way repeatedmeasures analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that perceived complexity of the questions in the three conditions differed significantly, F(1, 13) ϭ 50.96, p Ͻ .0005. Pairedsample t tests revealed that the measures in the crossed categorization condition were perceived to be significantly more complex (M ϭ 4.79, SD ϭ 1.74) than were the measures in either the common ingroup condition (M ϭ 4.07, SD ϭ 2.16), t(13) ϭ Ϫ2.92, p ϭ .012), or the baseline condition (M ϭ 2.43, SD ϭ 1.74), t(13) ϭ Ϫ5.88, p Ͻ .0005. We also found that the common ingroup identity questions were perceived to be significantly more complex than were questions in the baseline condition, t(13) ϭ Ϫ4.60, p Ͻ .0005.
Dependent measures.
Intergroup bias. In the baseline condition, participants' mean response to questions regarding doctors in general (outgroup) was subtracted from their mean response to questions regarding nurses in general (ingroup). For the common ingroup and crossed categorization conditions, intergroup bias was measured by subtracting participants' mean responses to the three items regarding doctors in Hospital A (outgroup) from their responses to the three items regarding nurses in Hospital A (ingroup). As was noted in the introduction, the underlying process that drives bias in common ingroup contexts is categorization based and to do with maintaining (for higher identifiers) clear differentiation from the outgroup. As such, it was most appropriate to create indices of the difference in evaluation (and self-categorization) between the ingroup and the outgroup. The re-maining questions regarding Hospital B in the two experimental conditions were not coded (because they were there as part of the manipulation, and could not be compared across conditions).
Self-categorization. In the baseline condition, participants' mean response to the self-doctors (outgroup) overlap item was subtracted from their mean response to the self-nurses (ingroup) overlap item. For the common ingroup and crossed categorization condition, participants' mean response to the self-doctors at Hospital A (outgroup) was subtracted from their mean response to the self-nurses (ingroup) at Hospital A. As for evaluations, the remaining questions regarding Hospital B in the two experimental conditions were not coded.
Results and Discussion
We first considered correlations between the variables in each condition (see Table 2 ). In the control condition, identification was positively correlated with self-categorization and intergroup bias, but self-categorization and intergroup bias were not related. In the common ingroup condition, identification was positively correlated with self-categorization and intergroup bias, and self-categorization was positively correlated with intergroup bias. In line with our predictions, there were no significant correlations between these three variables in the crossed categorization condition. As was expected, identification was the strongest predictor of self-categorization and bias, and the latter two were related, in the common ingroup condition. While there was weaker evidence of these differentiation-based processes in the baseline condition (as one might expect), there was no evidence of any differentiation-based relationship in the complex crossed categorization condition.
We next used moderated regression (Aiken & West, 1991) to test the moderating effect of baseline versus crossed versus common ingroup categorization on the relationship between group identification and both intergroup bias and selfcategorization. 1 We first created two contrast codes that represented helmert contrasts to test our precise predictions. Contrast 1 tested whether there would be a difference between the baseline and common ingroup condition (ϩ1, Ϫ1, 0). Contrast 2 tested whether there would be a difference between the baseline and common ingroup conditions in comparison with the cross-cutting condition (Ϫ1, Ϫ1, ϩ2). We multiplied each of these contrasts by the centered continuous identification scores for each participant and entered each interaction variable into a multiple regression on a second step following the insertion of the categorization and identification factors independently at Step 1.
Intergroup bias.

Contrast 1: baseline versus common ingroup.
The moderated regression analysis revealed no significant interaction on entering the interaction variable at Step 2 (␤ ϭ .622, p ϭ .361, R 2 change ϭ .859). The only effect was a main effect of identification (␤ ϭ .483, p ϭ .003). Higher identification was associated with higher bias.
Contrast 2: baseline and common ingroup versus crossed categorization. The moderated regression analysis revealed a main effect of categorization contrast 2 (␤ ϭ .251, p ϭ .059). Overall, there was less bias after crossed categorization 1 We focused on difference scores because these are the most theoretically precise measures to use in this research on reducing intergroup bias (bias and self-categorization are by definition relative judgments, so focusing on just one index such as outgroup evaluation may not fully capture the impact on intergroup perception). We note, however, that we obtained the same interaction on the key contrast 2 as is reported in this article on outgroup evaluations ( p Ͻ .031) and categorization as an ingroup member ( p Ͻ .10). than in the control and common ingroup conditions. There was also a significant interaction on entering the interaction variable at Step 2 (␤ ϭ 1.23, p ϭ .050, R 2 change ϭ .061; see Figure 1 ). Further analysis revealed a significant positive association between identification and bias only in the common ingroup condition (␤ ϭ .561, p ϭ .015), but a relationship that approached significance in the baseline condition (␤ ϭ .372, p ϭ .117) and a nonsignificant relationship in the crossed categorization condition (␤ ϭ Ϫ.048, p ϭ .861).
Self-categorization. An index of self-categorization as an ingroup member was created by subtracting perceived overlap with the outgroup from perceived overlap with the ingroup. We computed the same contrasts on this index of self-categorization as we had on bias.
Contrast 1: baseline versus common ingroup condition. The moderated regression analysis revealed no significant interaction on entering the interaction variable at Step 2 (␤ ϭ .595, p ϭ .326, R 2 change ϭ .016). The only effect was a main effect of identification (␤ ϭ .690, p Ͻ .0005). Irrespective of whether participants thought about the ingroup and outgroup in the context of a common ingroup or not, higher identification led to higher self-categorization. There was also a marginal main effect of categorization (␤ ϭ .248, p ϭ .074). Overall there was marginally more self-categorization as an ingroup member in the common ingroup condition than there was in the baseline condition.
Contrast 2: baseline and common ingroup versus crossed categorization. The moderated regression analysis revealed a significant interaction on entering the interaction variable at Step 2 (␤ ϭ 1.29, p ϭ .037, R 2 change ϭ .070; see Figure 2 ). Simple slope analysis revealed a significant positive association between identification and bias in the baseline condition (␤ ϭ .526, p ϭ .021) and in the common ingroup condition (␤ ϭ .774, p Ͻ .0005) but a nonsignificant relationship in the crossed categorization condition (␤ ϭ .016, p ϭ .957).
Because we observed a significant relationship between identification and bias, and between identification and self-categorization, only in the common ingroup condition, we also checked to see whether in this condition self-categorization mediated the effect of identification on bias. We did indeed observe a significant path from selfcategorization to bias controlling for identification (␤ ϭ .864, p ϭ .004), and when we controlled for self-categorization, the relationship between identification and bias became nonsignificant (␤ ϭ Ϫ.108, p ϭ .676, Sobel Z ϭ 2.80, p ϭ .005; see Figure 3 ). Crisp and Hewstone (2007) argued that intergroup bias can be caused by two processes in multiple category contexts. In simple contexts, the processes are driven by category differentiation. Correspondingly, in common ingroup contexts, reducing differentiation decreases bias among low identifiers but can lead to a reactive increase in bias among high identifiers. However, in crossed categorization contexts, perceivers are compelled to adopt a more complex mode of impression formation that cannot rely on perceived differentiation. We tested this hypothesis in Study 1 by comparing what we know should be the relationship between differentiation and bias in more simple category contexts with more complex multiple category contexts. We found support for the differentiation route to intergroup bias; identification predicted both self-categorization and intergroup bias in the control condition and in the common ingroup condition, but it predicted neither after crossed categorization.
Although we have shown here that differentiation-based processes do not operate in more complex crossed category contexts, we did not provide any direct evidence that an alternative process is occurring in the crossed categorization condition. We therefore conducted a second study to test whether-in the same way that self-categorization uniquely underlies intergroup bias in simple category contextscategory complexity would uniquely underlie intergroup bias in crossed categorization contexts.
Study 2
Previous research has shown that crossed categorization contexts can lead to reduced bias via an apparent increased focus on individuating characteristics Hall & Crisp, 2005) . This research has also shown that crossed categorizations can instigate more effortful thought (Hutter & Crisp, 2006) and can lead to the formation of impressions characterized by more idiosyncratic, and less stereotyped, characteristics (Hutter & Crisp, 2005) . Crisp and Hewstone (2007) argued that what determines shifts in focus from differentiationbased impressions to these more individualfocused impressions is the degree of perceived complexity of the intergroup context. To the extent that a context is perceived as complex, it will instigate the more systematic processing associated with the outcomes described above (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990 ; see also Brewer & Pierce, 2005) . Recently, Crisp (in press) has argued that while functionally the impact of perceiving multiple identities may lead to effects similar to "individuation," it may be more useful to think about this process as a more complex person construal along multiple dimensions. Thus, while the content of the construal in multiple-category contexts may be differentiated from what Fiske and Neuberg (1990) envisaged by their idea of individuated perception, the process (i.e., increased attention) will be the same. If this is correct, then complexity should be what predicts bias in the crossed categorization condition but not in the common ingroup or baseline conditions. It also provides us with a means of testing a double dissociation between the proposed processes and measurable correlates in more simple and more complex category contexts. How to measure complexity as a psychological concept distinct from self-categorization and differentiation? Roccas and Brewer (2002) proposed that individuals can perceive their multiple group memberships in terms of a dimension they call complexity. Social identity complexity refers to an individual's subjective representation of the interrelationships among his or her multiple group identities. It refers, in part, to the degree of overlap perceived to exist between groups of which a person is simultaneously a member (see also Roccas and Brewer's discussion of "similarity complexity"). When one's representation is low in complexity, it is an indication that one perceives a high overlap between both the typical characteristics of one's various social category memberships and an overlap between the actual members of those same categories. High complexity, by contrast, implies that the representation of each ingroup category is distinct from the others, both in characteristics and in membership. Brewer and Pierce (2005) have shown that higher levels of social identity complexity (more cross-cutting category memberships) are associated with greater outgroup tolerance, including greater support for affirmative action and multiculturalism. More recently, Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, and Hughes (in press) found that social identity complexity was associated with reduced perception of threat and decreased bias.
Although Brewer and colleagues' work is focused only on ingroup identities, conceptually we can extent the principle of complexity (defined by category overlap) to include both ingroup and outgroup identities and, as such, apply this theorizing to the crossed categorization paradigm. In this way, Brewer and colleagues' work not only illustrates how category complexity can have a positive impact on intergroup relations but, importantly for us, also provides a conceptual tool with which to distinguish different routes to the reduction of intergroup bias. It is complexity defined by overlap that is the critical determinant of reduced bias in crossed categorization contexts.
Given its mediating role in Study 1 and its possible conceptual overlap with the Likert measure of identity (see Stone & Crisp, 2007) , we used self-categorization as our proxy for the differentiation-based process, which we expected to be related to intergroup bias in the common ingroup condition, as in Study 1. In contrast a measure of category complexity was expected to predict intergroup bias in the crossed categorization condition. We predicted a double dissociation: Self-categorization, but not complexity, would be related to intergroup bias in the common ingroup (and baseline) condition, whereas complexity, but not selfcategorization, would be related to intergroup bias in the crossed categorization condition.
Method
Participants and design. Twenty-nine female psychology students (ages between 18 and 41 years, with a mean age of 25 years) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (baseline vs. common ingroup vs. crossed categorization), with self-categorization, category complexity, and intergroup evaluations as the dependent measures.
Procedure. Participants were first informed that the researcher was interested in the perceptions of women and men who study different subjects (majors) at university and that this particular study would focus on psychology students and engineering students. Participants were then told, "This survey is concerned with attitudes of different students, and how their respective qualities can contribute to generic problem-solving work teams. The information provided from this survey will be useful when assessing the general team-working skills across a variety of students." The target groups that participants were asked about in the remainder of the questionnaire differed depending on the condition to which participants were allocated.
In the baseline condition, participants were told that they were going to be asked to think specifically about psychology students and engineering students and that they would be asked to compare the groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, participants were asked to circle their subject of study (psychology or engineering). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonacademic problemsolving task for psychology students and engi-neering students: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) psychology students, (b) engineering students"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) psychology students, (b) engineering students would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) psychology students, (b) engineering students" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much) . Finally, participants were presented with the IOS scale (Aron et al., 1992) and asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) psychology students and (b) engineering students.
In the common ingroup condition, participants were asked to think specifically about male and female psychology students and male and female engineering students and that they would be asked to compare these groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, we asked participants to circle their subject of study (psychology or engineering) and their gender (female or male). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonacademic problemsolving task for female psychology students, female engineering students, and men: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) men"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) men would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) men" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). Finally, participants were presented with the IOS scale, for which they were asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) female psychology students (b) female engineering students, and (c) men. By getting participants to compare themselves with a superordinate outgroup (men), this condition was designed to make the superordinate ingroup (women) salient. In other words, it generated a common ingroup identity.
In the crossed categorization condition, participants were told that they were going to be asked to think specifically about psychology students and engineering students who are women, and psychology students and engineering students who are men, and that they would be asked to compare these groups in a variety of ways. To make their group membership salient, participants were asked to circle their subject of study (psychology or engineering) and their gender (female or male). Participants were then asked to indicate their agreement with each of the following three statements regarding working in a team on a nonacademic problemsolving task for female psychology students, female engineering students, male psychology students, and male engineering students: "It would be easy working with a group of (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) male psychology students, (d) male engineering students"; "I think a group comprised of mainly (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) male psychology students, (d) male engineering students would provide the most supportive environment"; and "I feel that my opinion would be valued when working with a group of (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) male psychology students, (d) male engineering students" (1 ϭ not at all, 9 ϭ very much). Finally, participants were presented with the IOS scale, for which they were asked to indicate which pair of circles best represented their relationship with (a) female psychology students, (b) female engineering students, (c) male psychology students, and (d) male engineering students. By getting participants to make comparisons along two cross-cutting dimensions (subject of study and gender) simultaneously, this condition was designed to lead to a more complex intergroup context than was present in either of the preceding two conditions.
Dependent measures.
Self-categorization. In the baseline condition, participants' mean response to the selfengineering students (outgroup) overlap item was subtracted from their mean response to the self-psychology students (ingroup) overlap item. For the common ingroup and crossed categorization condition, participants' mean response to the self-female engineering students (outgroup) overlap item was subtracted from their mean response to the self-female psychology students (ingroup). The questions regarding overlap between the self and men (in the common ingroup condition) and between the self and psychology and engineering students who were men (in the crossed categorization condition) formed part of the manipulation, and responses to these items were not analyzed.
Category complexity. We adapted Roccas and Brewer's (2002) measure of social identity complexity so that rather than focus on the complexity of one's own identity, it asked about the complexity of the groups included in the study. Specifically, on an 11-point Likert scale, participants reported the degree to which they felt the following groups overlapped with one another: Women and psychology students, men and psychology students, women and engineering students, men and engineering students, psychology students and women, psychology students and men, engineering students and women, engineering students and men (0 ϭ no overlap, 10 ϭ complete overlap). Less overlap between the different groups represents greater category complexity. We therefore reverse coded so that a higher score represents greater category complexity and created a composite measure from the mean score on these items (␣ ϭ .67).
Intergroup bias. In the baseline condition, participants' mean response to questions regarding engineering students in general (outgroup) was subtracted from their mean response to questions regarding psychology students in general (ingroup). For the common ingroup and crossed categorization conditions, intergroup bias was measured by subtracting participants' mean responses to the three items regarding female engineering students (outgroup) from their responses to the three items regarding female psychology students (ingroup). The remaining questions regarding men (in the common ingroup condition) and psychology students and engineering students who were men (in the crossed categorization condition) formed part of the manipulation, and responses to these items were not coded.
Results and Discussion
Our aim was to examine the correlations between self-categorization, category complexity, and intergroup bias in each of the three conditions (see Table 3) 2 to detect a double dissociation of hypothesized process relationships. In the control condition, self-categorization was positively correlated with intergroup bias (r ϭ .71, p Ͻ .05), but no relationship emerged between category complexity and intergroup bias (r ϭ Ϫ.09, p ϭ .83). In the common ingroup condition, a similar pattern emerged: Selfcategorization was positively correlated with intergroup bias (r ϭ .62, p Ͻ .05), but no relationship emerged between category complexity and intergroup bias (r ϭ .36, p ϭ .31). In the crossed categorization condition, however, this pattern was reversed: Self-categorization did not correlate with intergroup bias (r ϭ .25, p ϭ .49), but a significant negative relationship emerged between category complexity and intergroup bias (r ϭ Ϫ.64, p Ͻ .05).
We therefore observed, as was predicted, that when the category context was relatively simple (i.e., in the control and common ingroup conditions), self-categorization as a group member predicted intergroup bias. This is indicative of the proposed underlying differentiation process. 2 We found no between-groups differences on the dependent measures (bias: M baseline ϭ 1.96 vs. M common ingroup ϭ 1.12 vs. M crossed categorization ϭ 0.733; self-categorization: M baseline ϭ 1.78 vs. M common ingroup ϭ 1.10 vs. M crossed categorization ϭ 1.90; complexity: M baseline ϭ 4.13 vs. M common ingroup ϭ 4.80 vs. M crossed categorization ϭ 4.90). This might be because of the nature of the groups we used (engineering and psychology students were not engaged in any directly relevant intergroup comparison in Study 2, in contrast to the relationship between nurses and doctors in Study 1). However, we argue that the detection of the predicted within-group differences, particularly in the absence of the between-groups differences, represents important evidence for our dual-process model. In contrast, when the category context was more complex (in the crossed categorization condition), greater perceived complexity of the intergroup context was associated with lower intergroup bias, consistent with the hypothesis derived theoretically from the concept of social identity complexity (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005) . These findings support the idea that multiple categorization can affect intergroup bias via two distinct routes and that these routes operate distinctly in different category contexts.
General Discussion
Study 1 yielded direct evidence that in crossed categorization contexts, differentiationbased processes may not be operative when the intergroup relations are perceived as complex. Among nurses who were encouraged to think of themselves as a member of the same common ingroup as doctors, identification was positively associated with intergroup bias. In other words, the more highly participants identified with being a nurse, the greater intergroup bias they showed against doctors when recategorized into a superordinate group. This relationship was mediated by self-categorization; high-identifying nurses considered themselves to be more similar to nurses than to doctors, a tendency which was in turn associated with higher levels of intergroup bias (for similar recent evidence of mediation by self-categorization in common ingroup contexts, see Stone & Crisp, 2007) . In contrast, among nurses who engaged in crossed categorization-that is, they thought of nurses and doctors at two different hospitals as members of four different subgroups-we observed no relationship between identification and intergroup bias.
In a different intergroup context, in Study 2 we replicated the finding that self-categorization was positively correlated with intergroup bias in the control and common ingroup conditions; the more participants saw themselves as similar to psychology students than to engineering students, the greater intergroup bias they showed against engineering students. Again, however, this relationship did not emerge in the crossed categorization condition. Extending our initial findings, we showed that category complexity was instead negatively correlated with intergroup bias in the crossed categorization condition: The more complex participants perceived the different categories involved to be, the less intergroup bias they expressed. This relationship did not, however, emerge in either the control or common ingroup conditions. These findings can be explained in terms of the different processes argued to underlie the common ingroup identity and crossed categorization approaches to reducing intergroup bias (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007) . When participants who identify strongly with their ingroup are compelled to consider their similarities to the outgroup (i.e., here in the context of common membership of a superordinate group), this represents a threat to a valued social identity. This motivates increased intergroup bias in order to positively differentiate from the outgroup (Brewer, 1993; Jetten et al., 2004) . In contrast, because it increases the complexity of the intergroup context, crossed categorization leads to a shift to a more systematic mode of impression formation, focusing on individual characteristics rather than on group membership in order to make judgments about others (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) . Here, if participants are no longer thinking in terms of group memberships, identification should have no influence on their level of intergroup bias. Rather, the more complex they perceive the category context to be, the less intergroup bias is observed. By measuring identification, self-categorization, and complexity, we were able to illustrate dissociation between these theoretically differently related variables in the two types of context.
Interestingly these findings resonate with those of Crisp et al. (2006a, Experiment 4) , who found that encouraging a dual identity, the maintenance of subgroups within a common ingroup identity condition (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) , reduced intergroup bias for both low and high identifiers. The overlap in these two sets of findings highlights points of convergence between the crossed categorization and dual identity models; both can apparently moderate the relationship between identification and intergroup bias.
Potential Limitations of the Research
We should note that we did not observe a reduction in intergroup bias among lower identifiers in the common ingroup condition. These findings are consistent with Crisp et al. (2006a) , who also found no reduction for lower identifiers in a common ingroup condition. However, we believe that the very strong main effect of identification in the baseline and common ingroup identity conditions may explain this effect.
A second potential limitation of our findings regards the interpretation of the common ingroup condition. One might argue that the method used to create a common ingroup identity condition is actually more like a "dual identity" approach, in which the two subgroups remain salient within the superordinate category (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) , because participants think about nurses and doctors at their hospital rather than simply thinking about medical staff in general. However, we arguably made the superordinate identity more salient than the subgroup identity by having participants compare nurses and doctors at their hospital to medical staff at another hospital, in other words, by comparing themselves to a superordinate outgroup. This is the continuum along which comparisons between common ingroup and simultaneous categorization contexts should be made (see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007 , for a more detailed account of this idea).
Implications of the Research
One of the main debates surrounding the common ingroup identity approach (Gaertner et al., 1989 (Gaertner et al., , 1990 ) is that it may be effective only at reducing intergroup bias in contexts in which group members are not strongly committed to the ingroup. However, in the majority of intergroup contexts in which interventions to reduce intergroup bias are necessary-for example, between different ethnic and national groupsindividuals often strongly identify with the ingroup. If this is the case, one might wonder how emphasizing a category shared by two rival groups could improve intergroup relations. The current findings illustrate a potential solution to this problem. Crossed categorization, because it increases the complexity of the intergroup context, can shift attention away from the intergroup level in making person judgments. As a consequence, the link between group identification and intergroup bias is moderated. The implication of this finding is that interventions to reduce intergroup bias, which increase the perceived complexity of the intergroup context (e.g., Crisp et al., 2006b) , are likely to be useful even in intergroup contexts in which group membership is of great importance to those involved.
It is important to note that not all crossed categorization contexts will be perceived as complex. In some cases, and depending upon a focus on specific comparisons (thus simplifying the overall impression), differentiation processes may occur in crossed categorization contexts (see Crisp & Hewstone, 2007) . We argue that it is not crossed categorization per se that leads to complexity, but that it is a context that is more likely to induce complexity-related processes than are common ingroup contexts. Future research may help to uncover specifically what types of context are more likely to produce complexity-related processes.
Conclusions
In this research, we examined the different processes that can lead to reduced bias in common ingroup and crossed categorization contexts. Previous research has shown that although the common ingroup approach, recategorizing two initial groups into a superordinate group, can reduce intergroup bias, it only does so for those who do not strongly identify with the ingroup. For high identifiers, a common ingroup is perceived as an identity threat that leads to increased intergroup bias. Here we showed that crossed categorization reduces intergroup bias irrespective of participants' level of identification with the ingroup. Moreover, we showed that in the crossed categorization condition alone, category complexity predicts intergroup bias. This supports the notion that social identity complexity may be a critical determinant of different routes to reduced prejudice.
